

Certification Report

Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik

BSI-DSZ-CC-0207-2003

for

IBM Directory Server 5.1
FixPak510-01

from

IBM Corporation

BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
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Deutsches IT-Sicherheitszertifikat

erteilt vom

Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik



Bundesamt für Sicherheit
in der Informationstechnik

BSI-DSZ-CC-0207-2003

IBM Directory Server 5.1

FixPak510-01

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Common Criteria Arrangement

The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an accredited and approved/licensed evaluation facility using the *Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Part 1 Version 0.6, Part 2 Version 1.0* for conformance to the *Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.1 (ISO/IEC 15408:1999)*.

Evaluation Results:

Functionality: **Product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 conformant**

Assurance Package: **Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL2**

This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.

The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.

The notes mentioned on the reverse side are part of this certificate.

Bonn, 19. August 2003

The President of the Federal Office
for Information Security



SOGIS-MRA

Dr. Helmbrecht

L.S.

Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik

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The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSI Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2)

This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.

Preliminary Remarks

Under the BSIG¹ Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of issuing certificates for information technology products. Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor, hereinafter called the sponsor.

A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.

The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by BSI itself.

The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report contains among others the Certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed Certification Results.

The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and instructions for the user.

¹ Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of 17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834

Contents

Part A: Certification

Part B: Certification Results

Part C: Excerpts from the Criteria

A Certification

1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure

The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the following:

- BSIG²
- BSI Certification Ordinance³
- BSI Schedule of Costs⁴
- Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the Interior)
- DIN EN 45011 standard
- BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
- Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.1⁵
- Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM)
 - Part 1, Version 0.6
 - Part 2, Version 1.0
- BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS)

² Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of 17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834

³ Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 7 July 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230

⁴ Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 29th October 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1838

⁵ Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 22nd September 2000 in the Bundesanzeiger p. 19445

2 Recognition Agreements

In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or CC - under certain conditions was agreed.

2.1 ITSEC/CC - Certificates

The SOGIS-Agreement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on ITSEC became effective on 3 March 1998. This agreement was signed by the national bodies of Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. This agreement on the mutual recognition of IT security certificates based on the CC was extended to include certificates based on the CC for all evaluation levels (EAL 1 – EAL 7).

2.2 CC - Certificates

An arrangement (Common Criteria Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC evaluation assurance levels up to and including EAL 4 was signed in May 2000. It includes also the recognition of Protection Profiles based on the CC. The arrangement was signed by the national bodies of Australia, Canada, Finland France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, United Kingdom and the United States. Israel joined the arrangement in November 2000, Sweden in February 2002, Austria in November 2002.

3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification

The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.

The product IBM Directory Server 5.1 FixPak510-01 has undergone the certification procedure at BSI.

The evaluation of the product IBM Directory Server 5.1 FixPak510-01 was conducted by atsec information security GmbH which is an evaluation facility recognised by BSI (ITSEF)⁶.

The sponsor and developer is:

IBM Corporation
11501 Burnet Road
Austin, TX 78758
USA.

The certification is concluded with

- the comparability check and
- the production of this Certification Report.

This work was completed by the BSI on 19th August 2003.

The confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that

- all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the following report, are observed,
- the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in the following report.

This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product indicated here. The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product, provided the sponsor applies for re-certification of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.

For the meaning of the assurance levels and the strength of functions, please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the Certification Report.

⁶ Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility

4 Publication

The following Certification Results contain pages B-1 to B-30.

The product IBM Directory Server 5.1 FixPak510-01 has been included in the BSI list of the certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: [http:// www.bsi.bund.de](http://www.bsi.bund.de)). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline 0228/9582-111.

Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the sponsor of the product. The Certification Report can also be downloaded from the above-mentioned website.

B Certification Results

The following results represent a summary of

- the security target of the sponsor for the target of evaluation,
- the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
- complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.

Contents of the certification results

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1 Executive Summary

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is IBM Directory Server 5.1 FixPak510-01 (also named IDS in short). IDS is an implementation of the Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) and meets the requirements of LDAP Version 3 as defined in RFC 2251–2256 and LDAP Version 2 as defined in RFC 1777.

LDAP is essentially a specialised database where the update operation is less frequent and dedicated to the common goal within the enterprise on consolidating and unifying the management of identity. IBM Directory Server is built for identity management with role supports, fine-grained access control and entry ownership.

The IBM Directory Server is a software product only, delivered over the Internet as a package including

- the TOE (the LDAP server and the administration daemon executables),
- user and administrative tools (like IBM Directory Server Client SDK 5.1 or the Web Administration Tool),
- a WebSphere HTTP server,
- and an IBM DB2 database.

Note: Although delivered together with the TOE, the user and administrator tools, the HTTP server and the DB2 database are all excluded from the TOE and are considered part of the environment. **The TOE are the LDAP server and the administration daemon executables only.**

The TOE environment can also include applications that are not delivered with the IBM Directory Server, but are used as unprivileged tools, for example the Netscape browser needed to administrate the TOE or the Adobe Acrobat Reader to access the supplied online documentation.

The TOE provides the following evaluated security functionality:

- Identification and authentication
- Access control
- Auditing
- Management
- Reference mediation

To ensure a secure usage, a set of guidance documents is provided together with the IDS. Details can be found in chapter 6 of this report.

The TOE can use a variety of different hardware and operating system platforms to operate on. For the hardware/OS combinations used during the

evaluation of the TOE please refer to chapter 7. Please note that no hardware is provided with the TOE.

The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) used in the Security Target are Common Criteria Part 2 conformant as shown in the following table:

| Security Functional Requirement | Functionality |
|--|--|
| FAU_GEN.1 | Audit data generation |
| FAU_GEN.2 | User identity association |
| FAU_SAR.1 | Audit review |
| FAU_SAR.2 | Restricted audit review |
| FDP_ACC.2 | Complete access control |
| FDP_ACF.1 | Security attribute based access control |
| FIA_AFL.1 | Authentication failure handling |
| FIA_ATD.1 | User attribute definition |
| FIA_SOS.1 | Verification of secrets |
| FIA_UAU.1 | Timing of authentication |
| FIA_UID.1 | Timing of identification |
| FMT_MOF.1a ⁷ | Management of security functions behaviour |
| FMT_MOF.1b | Management of security functions behaviour |
| FMT_MSA.1 | Management of security attributes |
| FMT_MSA.3 | Static attribute initialisation |
| FMT_MTD.1 | Management of TSF data |
| FMT_SMF.1 | Specification of Management Functions |
| FMT_SMR.1 | Security Roles |
| FPT_RVM.1 | Non-bypassability of the TSP |

The TOE IBM Directory Server 5.1 FixPak510-01 was evaluated by:

atsec information security GmbH
 Steinstraße 70
 81667 München
 Germany.

⁷ Notation of SFR component iteration: FXX_XXX.ya means iteration "a" of the SFR FXX_XXX.y

The evaluation was completed on 18th July 2003. The atsec information security GmbH is an evaluation facility recognised by BSI (ITSEF)⁸.

The sponsor and developer is:

IBM Corporation
11501 Burnet Road
Austin, TX 78758
USA

1.1 Assurance package

The TOE security assurance requirements are based entirely on the assurance components defined in part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C of this report, or [1], part 3 for details).

The TOE meets the assurance requirements of assurance level EAL2 (Evaluation Assurance Level 2).

1.2 Functionality

The TOE IDS provides the following Security Functions:

| Name | Function |
|--|--|
| Audit | |
| F.AUDIT.1 | Generation of audit and error log information |
| Access Control | |
| F.ACCESS_CONTROL | Access control to particular LDAP operations |
| Identification & Authentication | |
| F.I&A.1 | Identification & authentication of TOE user |
| Management | |
| F.MANAGEMENT.1 | Management of the roles Directory Administrator and End User |
| F.MANAGEMENT.2 | Management of the authentication functionality |
| F.MANAGEMENT.3 | Management of authorisation on directory entries |
| F.MANAGEMENT.4 | Management of audit functionality |
| Reference Mediation | |
| F.REF_MEDIATION | Non-bypassability of the TSF |

⁸ Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility

Note: Only the titles of the SF and a short summary are provided here because they are very granular and almost self-explanatory. Please refer for a precise definition of the SF to the Security Target of the TOE ([5], chapter 6.1)

1.3 Strength of Function

The TOE's strength of function is claimed SOF-basic for the password based authentication function F.I&A.1 only.

1.4 Summary of threats and Organisational Security Policies (OSPs) addressed by the evaluated IT product

A summary of the threats defined in [5], chapter 3.2.1 is provided here. For the precise description of the threats please refer to [5]:

T.ENTRY:

Unauthorised, malicious access to a resource/information protected by the TOE.

T.ACCESS:

Unauthorised execution of operations.

T.ACCOUNT:

Security relevant actions occur without awareness by Directory Administrators.

T.BYPASS:

Bypass of the TOE security functions.

Please note that T.ACCESS is not entirely averted by the TOE. Instead, additional support from the TOE's environment is needed. For information which parts are averted by the TOE and which by the environment of the TOE, please refer to [5], chapter 8.1 (Security Objective Rationale) and to chapter 4.3 of this report.

The TOE has to comply to the following Organisational Security Policy (OSP).

P.PUBLIC:

Of the information under the control of the TOE, only information classified as public information should be made available to unauthenticated or anonymous users.

1.5 Special configuration requirements

According to the Security Target Directory Server can be run on

- Microsoft Windows 2000,
- IBM AIX 5.2,

- Sun Solaris 8,
- Red Hat Advanced Server 2.1, and
- SuSE Linux Enterprise Server 8.

Please note that

- the underlying hardware and the operating system used by the Directory Server,
- the Database used as back-end data store,
- the LDAP clients,
- the SSL module used for the protection of the path between the LDAP clients and the server and between LDAP servers and
- the replication service between LDAP servers

are **not part of the TOE**. They are hence out of evaluation scope. Please refer to [5], chapter 2.3 for more information.

No explicit restrictions on the usable hardware were made in the Security Target [5]. For information on the hardware / OS platform used during evaluation, please refer to chapter 7 of this report.

1.6 Assumptions about the operating environment

The following constraints concerning the operating environment are made in the Security Target.

The following constraints are based on the assumptions defined in [5], chapter 3.1. They are reproduced here:

A.PHYSICAL

The TOE is operated in a physically secure environment.

A.NOEVIL

The TOE and TOE Environment Administrators are trustworthy to perform discretionary actions in accordance with security policies and not to interfere with the abstract machine.

A.ADMIN

The TOE and TOE environment are competently installed and administered.

A.COMM

It is assumed that a communication link exists from the TOE to LDAP clients on external systems, and that any communication links between the TOE and external systems are protected against unauthorised modification and disclosure of communication data.

A.COOP

Authorised end users are trusted and expected to act in a co-operating manner in a benign environment.

A.TIME

It is assumed that a reliable time is provided by the TOE environment.

1.7 Disclaimers

The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification Report. The rating of the strength of functions does not include cryptoalgorithms suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2). This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.

2 Identification of the TOE

The Target of Evaluation is called:

IBM Directory Server 5.1 FixPak510-01

The IBM Directory Server is a software product only, delivered over the Internet as a package including

| Component | TOE / Not TOE |
|--|---------------|
| The LDAP server daemon executable and Administration daemon executable. | TOE |
| User and administrative tools (like the IBM Directory Server Client SDK 5.1 or the Web Administration Tool). | Not TOE. |
| A WebSphere HTTP server. | Not TOE |
| A IBM DB2 database. | Not TOE |

Note: Although delivered together with the TOE, the user and administrator tools, the HTTP server and the DB2 database are all excluded from the TOE and are considered part of the environment. **The TOE are the the LDAP server and the administration daemon executables only.**

The TOE environment can also include applications that are not delivered with the IBM Directory Server, but are used as unprivileged tools, for example the Netscape browser needed to administrate the TOE or the Adobe Acrobat Reader to access the supplied online documentation.

The TOE can be subdivided into two major components:

- The LDAP Server executable
- and the LDAP Server Administration Daemon executable.

The LDAP server may be partitioned again into two parts: the Front -end and the Back-end. The Front-end is the network interface to LDAP clients and the Back-end is the interface to a DB2 database. The Administration Daemon provides an LDAP interface to clients, used for the administration of the LDAP server. For more details refer to chapter 5.

A set of Guidance documents is provided with the TOE (for a list please refer to chapter 6). To install and configure the TOE in an evaluation conformant way the user has to follow the guidance documentation provided in [14], [10], [11], [12], [13] and [9]. The Security Guide [9] provides guidance on how to configure the TOE in accordance with the Security Target. For the secure operation of the TOE [8] is required.

3 Security Policy

The TOE is an implementation of the Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP). Its main purpose is to provide identification and authentication, access control and audit functionality. This is supplemented by management and non-bypassability.

Therefore the Security Policy of the TOE is defined by the following TOE security functional requirements:

- All SFR components being part of the CC class FIA (like FIA_SOS.1 defining the password policy constraints).
- FDP_ACC.2 and FDP_ACF.1 defining the Directory Access Control SFP, a Security Policy that controls access to directory entries protected by the TOE.

A detailed description/definition of the Security Policy enforced by the TOE is given in the Security Target [5], chapter 5.1.

4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope

4.1 Usage assumptions

Based on the Organisational Security Policy to which the TOE complies the following usage assumption arise (for the detailed and precise definition refer to [5], chapter 3.3):

- Of the information under the control of the TOE, only information classified as public information should be made available to unauthenticated or anonymous users (P.PUBLIC).

Based on personnel assumptions defined in [5] the following usage conditions exist:

- The Administrators of the TOE and its environment are trustworthy to perform discretionary actions in accordance with security policies and not to interfere with the abstract machine (A.NOEVIL).
- The TOE and its environment are competently installed and administered (A.ADMIN).
- Authorised users are expected to act in a co-operating manner in a benign environment (A.COOP).

For a detailed description of the usage assumptions refer to the Security Target [5], especially chapter 3.2.1 and 4.2.

4.2 Environmental assumptions

The following assumptions about physical and connectivity aspects defined by the Security Target have to be met (refer to Security Target [5], chapter 3.2.1 and 4.2):

- The TOE is operated in a physically secure environment (A.PHYSICAL).
- Communication links (between TOE and LDAP clients on external systems, and between the TOE and external systems) are protected against modification and disclosure of transmitted data (A.COM).
- A reliable time is provided by the environment (A.TIME).

Please consider also the requirements for the evaluated configuration specified in chapter 8 of this report.

4.3 Clarification of scope

The threats listed below are not averted by the TOE. Additional support from the operating environment of the TOE is necessary (for detailed information about the threats and how the environment cover them refer to the Security Target [5], especially chapter 3.2.2 and chapter 8.1).

TE.USAGE:

The TOE may be configured, used and administered in an insecure manner, allowing an illegitimate user gaining access to resources or information protected by the TOE.

TE.CRASH:

Human error or a failure of software, hardware, power supply, or an accidental event may cause an abrupt interruption to the TOE operation, resulting in loss or corruption of data.

TE.SOPHISTICATED:

An unauthorised individual may gain access to TOE resources or information by using sophisticated technical attack, using IT security-defeating tools applied to the TOE or the underlying system components.

TE.PASS:

An attacker may bypass the TOE to access resources or resources protected by the TOE by attacking the underlying operating system or database, in order to gain access to TOE resources and information.

Please note that T.ACCESS is directed to the TOE but partially has to be addressed by the TOE environment as well (refer to chapter 1.4 for details on T.ACCESS).

5 Architectural Information

General overview

The target of evaluation is the IBM Directory Server Version 5.1 FixPak510-01. IBM Directory Server version 5.1 is an implementation of the Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP), which is compliant with the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) LDAP Version 2 specifications, i.e. RFC 1777 and Version 3 specifications, i.e. RFC 2251 - 2256.

The server is a software only product and can be installed and operated on variety of hardware/software platforms (refer to chapter 1.5).

LDAP essentially provides access to and management of a specialised database where the update operation is less frequent and dedicated to the common goal within the enterprise on consolidating and unifying the management of identity.

IBM Directory Server is built for identity management with role support, fine-grained access control and entry ownership. It provides the foundation for improved security, rapid development and deployment of Web applications.

The IBM DB2 Universal Database is used as back end data store to provide high performance, reliability and stability in an enterprise or e-business.

The IBM Directory Server (IDS) Version 5.1 is a software product only, delivered over the Internet as a package including the TOE, user and administrative tools, a WebSphere HTTP server, and a DB2 database. The user and administrator tools, the HTTP server and the DB2 database are all excluded from the TOE and are considered part of the environment.


The TOE environment can also include applications that are not delivered with the IDS product, but are used as unprivileged tools, for example the Netscape browser needed to administrate the TOE or the Adobe Acrobat Reader to access the supplied online documentation.

Major structural units of the TOE

The TOE is the LDAP Server and the Administration Daemon as part of the product IBM Directory Server.

User clients are connecting both to the LDAP server and to the administration daemon, using the LDAP protocol, but using different port numbers. The LDAP server component is providing the LDAP functionality to users and administrators, while the administration daemon is only used by the administrator for starting, stopping and querying the status of the TOE.

The following figure provides a more detailed overview of the TOE:



TOE functionality

Identification and authentication

Identification and authentication are used to determine the identity of the LDAP clients; that is, verifying that users are who they say they are. A user name and password is a basic authentication scheme. This user identity is used for determining access rights and for user accountability. The administrator can manage users, set passwords for users, and place restrictions on user-selected passwords by specifying rules in the password policy managed by the administrator.

Access control

After users are authenticated, it must be determined whether they have authorisation or permission to perform the requested operation on the specific object. Authorisation is often based on access control lists (ACLs).

An ACL is a list of authorisations that can be attached to objects and attributes in the directory. An ACL lists what type of access each user or a group of users is allowed or denied. To make ACLs shorter and more manageable, users with the same access rights are often put into groups. The directory administrator can manage access control by specifying the access rights to objects for individual users or groups.

Auditing

The IBM Directory Server can perform auditing of security-relevant events, such as user authentication and modification to the directory tree. The audit function provides a means for accountability by generating audit records containing the time, user identity, and additional information about the operation. The behaviour of the audit function, such as selection of auditable events, as well as audit review and clearing of audit files, is managed by the directory administrator.

Management

The IBM Directory Server is supporting the roles of Directory Administrator and End User, allowing the Directory Administrator to manage the functions for identification and authentication, authorisation and audit. The Directory Administrator can also manage the users and user attributes.

Reference mediation

The IBM Directory Server is designed that all security policy enforcement functions are invoked and must succeed before any function is allowed to proceed. This means that any request for access to a directory entry is checked for access according to the rules defined before access is granted.

6 Documentation

The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to the customer:

- [7] IBM Directory Server Version 5.1 README Addendum, Second Edition (December 2002).
- [8] IBM Directory Server Version 5.1, Administration Guide, First Edition (November 2002).
- [9] IBM Directory Server Version 5.1, Common Criteria Compliant Configuration Security Guide, Version 0.9
- [10] FixPak FP510A-01 README for IBM Directory Server 5.1 AIX (April 2003).
- [11] FixPak FP510L-01 README for IBM Directory Server 5.1 Linux i386 (April 2003).
- [12] FixPak FP510S-01 README for IBM Directory Server 5.1 Solaris OS (April 2003).
- [13] FixPak FP510W-01 README for IBM Directory Server 5.1 Windows® OS (April 2003).
- [14] IBM Directory Server Version 5.1, Installation Guide and Configuration, First Edition (November 2002).
- [15] IBM Directory Server 5.1, Server Plug-ins Reference, First Edition (November 2002).
- [16] C-Client SDK Programming Reference, First Edition (November 2002).
- [17] IBM Directory Server Version 5.1, QuickStart, First Edition (November 2002).
- [18] IBM Directory Server Version 5.1, Performance Tuning Guide, Second Edition (December, 2002)

7 IT Product Testing

Test Schedule

Developer testing was performed from March 3 to March 14, 2003 at IBM in Austin, Texas. Evaluator testing was performed in May 2003 at IBM in Munich, on an AIX 5.2 system, and at the evaluation facility site in Munich, on Microsoft Windows 2000, SuSE Linux Enterprise Server 8, Red Hat Advanced Server and Solaris 8.

Test configuration

The test have been performed on the following platforms:

- Operating System: Microsoft Windows 2000, Windows 2000 Fix pack 3
Hardware: IBM Thinkpad 600 E
- Operating System: SuSE Linux Enterprise Server 8
Hardware: IBM Thinkpad 600 E
- Operating System: Red Hat Advanced Server 2.1
Hardware: IBM Thinkpad 600 E
- Operating System: IBM AIX 5.2.0.0
Hardware: RS 6000 Model 7044-270 (p-Series)
- Operating System: SUN Solaris Version 8.0
Hardware: SUN Sparc Ultra 5

Depth/Coverage of Testing

Although not required by the chosen evaluation assurance level 2 the developer did already testing on the level of the high-level design. According to the evaluation findings complete testing coverage was achieved for all the TOE security functions, with the developer tests and the additional tests performed by the independent evaluator testing.

Summary of Developer Testing Effort

Test configuration:

All the tests have been performed on the configuration defined above.

Testing approach:

The developer provided evidence that the functionality of the TOE was tested exhaustively. The developer divided the testing effort needed for the TOE into several test areas representing groups of similar functionality. Each test area comprised several function tests that probe for the behaviour of the functions to be tested. For each single test case, the developer provided sufficient

information on the setup of the test environment and on the instructions needed to actually run the test.

Testing results:

The developer testing was performed successfully by the developer on all tested platforms comprising the evaluated configuration of the TOE. The actual test results were made available to the evaluator for inspection during an on-site introduction to the developer's development and testing facility.

Summary of Evaluator Testing Effort

Test configuration

The evaluator performed his tests mainly at the atsec evaluation facility in Munich. All the evaluator tests on AIX 5.2 were performed by the evaluator on a p610 system located at the developer's site in Munich, where the developer provided a machine for testing purposes.

The rerun of developer tests, with respect to the AIX5.2 platform were carried out at the IBM facility in Munich. All other tests regarding the remaining platforms of the evaluated configuration were performed at the atsec evaluation facility using the configurations listed above.

Testing approach:

The evaluator testing effort consists of two parts: The first one is the rerun of developer test cases and the second is the execution of the tests created by the evaluator.

- Sample of developer tests:
The evaluator successfully performed all sampled developer tests on all platforms that are part of the evaluated configuration of the TOE. The actual test results achieved by the evaluator matched the expected results.
- Evaluator tests:
Although complete coverage on all platforms was not intended, the evaluator performed almost all of the evaluator tests on all platforms. The security functionality of the TOE behaved as expected.

Evaluator penetration testing:

Penetration tests have been performed by the evaluation lab to assess possible vulnerabilities found during the evaluation of the different CC assurance classes.

8 Evaluated Configuration

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is IBM Directory Server 5.1 FixPak510-01 (also named IDS in short).

The IBM Directory Server is a software product only, delivered over the Internet as a package including

- the TOE (the LDAP server and the administration daemon executables),
- user and administrative tools (like IBM Directory Server Client SDK 5.1 or the Web Administration Tool),
- a WebSphere HTTP server,
- and an IBM DB2 database.

Note: Although delivered together with the TOE, the user and administrator tools, the HTTP server and the DB2 database are all excluded from the TOE and are considered part of the environment. **The TOE are the LDAP server and the administration daemon executables only.**

The TOE environment can also include applications that are not delivered with the IBM Directory Server, but are used as unprivileged tools, for example the Netscape browser needed to administrate the TOE or the Adobe Acrobat Reader to access the supplied online documentation.

The TOE can be run on the following Operating Systems:

- Microsoft Windows 2000,
- IBM AIX 5.2,
- Sun Solaris 8,
- Red Hat Advanced Server 2.1, and
- SuSE Linux Enterprise Server 8.

Please note that

- the underlying hardware and the operating system used by the Directory Server,
- the Database used as back-end data store,
- the LDAP clients,
- the SSL module used for the protection of the path between the LDAP clients and the server and between LDAP servers and
- the replication service between LDAP servers

are **not part of the TOE**. They are hence out of evaluation scope. Please refer to [5], chapter 2.3 for more information.

No restriction on the usable hardware was made in the Security Target [5]. For information on the hardware / OS platform used during evaluation, please refer to chapter 7 of this report.

The Administrators of the TOE and its environment are seen as trustworthy to perform discretionary actions in accordance with security policies. The TOE and its environment is competently installed and administered. Authorised users are expected to act in a co-operating manner in a benign environment.

The TOE is operated in a physically secure environment. Communication links (between TOE and LDAP clients on external systems, and between the TOE and external systems) are protected against modification and disclosure of transmitted data. A reliable time is provided by the TOE environment.

For setting up / configuring the TOE all guidance documents have to be followed (refer to chapter 6 of this report).

9 Results of the Evaluation

The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [6] was provided by the ITSEF according to the Common Criteria [1], the Common Evaluation Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.

The verdicts for the CC, Part 3 assurance components (according to EAL2 and the Security Target evaluation) are summarised in the following table:

| Assurance Classes and Components | | Verdict |
|---|--------------|---------|
| Security Target | CC Class ASE | PASS |
| TOE description | ASE_DES.1 | PASS |
| Security environment | ASE_ENV.1 | PASS |
| ST introduction | ASE_INT.1 | PASS |
| Security objectives | ASE_OBJ.1 | PASS |
| PP claims | ASE_PPC.1 | PASS |
| IT security requirements | ASE_REQ.1 | PASS |
| Explicitly stated IT security requirements | ASE_SRE.1 | PASS |
| TOE summary specification | ASE_TSS.1 | PASS |
| Configuration management | CC Class ACM | PASS |
| Configuration items | ACM_CAP.2 | PASS |
| Delivery and Operation | CC Class ADO | PASS |
| Delivery Procedures | ADO_DEL.1 | PASS |
| Installation, generation, and start-up procedures | ADO_IGS.1 | PASS |
| Development | CC class ADV | PASS |
| Informal functional specification | ADV_FSP.1 | PASS |
| Descriptive high-level design | ADV_HLD.1 | PASS |
| Informal correspondence demonstration | ADV_RCR.1 | PASS |
| Guidance documents | CC Class AGD | PASS |
| Administrator guidance | AGD_ADM.1 | PASS |
| User guidance | AGD_USR.1 | PASS |
| Tests | CC Class ATE | PASS |
| Evidence of coverage | ATE_COV.1 | PASS |
| Functional testing | ATE_FUN.1 | PASS |
| Independent testing - sample | ATE_IND.2 | PASS |
| Vulnerability assessment | CC Class AVA | PASS |
| Strength of TOE security function evaluation | AVA_SOF.1 | PASS |
| Developer vulnerability analysis | AVA_VLA.1 | PASS |

The evaluation has shown that the TOE fulfils the claimed strength of function (SOF-basic) for the authentication function using passwords.

The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the product IBM Directory Server 5.1 FixPak510-01 in the configuration as defined in the Security Target and summarised in this report (refer to the Security Target [5] and the chapters 2, 4 and 8 of this report). The validity can be extended to new versions and

releases of the product, provided the sponsor applies for re-certification of the modified product, and if the evaluation of the modified product does not reveal any security deficiencies.

10 Evaluator Comments/Recommendations

The User Guidance documentation (refer to chapter 6) contains necessary information about the secure usage of the TOE. Additionally, for secure usage of the TOE the fulfilment of the assumptions about the environment in the Security Target [5] and the Security Target as a whole has to be taken into account. Therefore a user/administrator has to follow the guidance in these documents.

11 Annexes

None.

12 Security Target

For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [5] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is provided within a separate document.

13 Definitions

13.1 Acronyms

| | |
|-------------|---|
| BSI | Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for Information Security |
| CC | Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation |
| CCRA | Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement |
| EAL | Evaluation Assurance Level |
| IT | Information Technology |
| OSP | Organisational Security Policy |
| PP | Protection Profile |
| SF | Security Function |
| SFP | Security Function Policy |
| SFR | Security Functional Requirement |
| SOF | Strength of Function |
| ST | Security Target |
| TOE | Target of Evaluation |
| TP | TSF Protection |
| TSC | TSF Scope of Control |
| TSF | TOE Security Functions |
| TSP | TOE Security Policy |

13.2 Glossary

Augmentation - The addition of one or more assurance component(s) from CC Part 3 to an EAL or assurance package.

Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the CC.

Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-established mathematical concepts.

Informal - Expressed in natural language.

Object - An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and upon which subjects perform operations.

Protection Profile - An implementation-independent set of security requirements for a category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs.

Security Function - A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon for enforcing a closely related subset of the rules from the TSP.

Security Target - A set of security requirements and specifications to be used as the basis for evaluation of an identified TOE.

Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.

Strength of Function - A qualification of a TOE security function expressing the minimum efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security behaviour by directly attacking its underlying security mechanisms.

SOF-basic - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the function provides adequate protection against casual breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a low attack potential.

SOF-medium - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the function provides adequate protection against straightforward or intentional breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a moderate attack potential.

SOF-high - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the function provides adequate protection against deliberately planned or organised breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a high attack potential.

Subject - An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.

Target of Evaluation - An IT product or system and its associated administrator and user guidance documentation that is the subject of an evaluation.

TOE Security Functions - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and firmware of the TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the TSP.

TOE Security Policy - A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed, protected and distributed within a TOE.

TSP Scope of Control - The set of interactions that can occur with or within a TOE and are subject to the rules of the TSP.

14 Bibliography

- [1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 2.1, August 1999
- [2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM), Part 1, Version 0.6; Part 2: Evaluation Methodology, Version 1.0, August 1999
- [3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
- [4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE
- [5] IBM Directory Server 5.1 FixPak 510-01 Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0207, Version 1.2, IBM Corporation, 2003-05-07
- [6] Evaluation Technical Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0207, Version 1.5, atsec information security GmbH, 2003-07-18 (confidential document)

User Guidance Documentation:

- [7] IBM Directory Server Version 5.1 README Addendum, Second Edition (December 2002).
- [8] IBM Directory Server Version 5.1, Administration Guide, First Edition (November 2002).
- [9] IBM Directory Server Version 5.1, Common Criteria Compliant Configuration Security Guide, Version 0.9
- [10] FixPak FP510A-01 README for IBM Directory Server 5.1 AIX (April 2003).
- [11] FixPak FP510L-01 README for IBM Directory Server 5.1 Linux i386 (April 2003).
- [12] FixPak FP510S-01 README for IBM Directory Server 5.1 Solaris OS (April 2003).
- [13] FixPak FP510W-01 README for IBM Directory Server 5.1 Windows® OS (April 2003).
- [14] IBM Directory Server Version 5.1, Installation Guide and Configuration, First Edition (November 2002).
- [15] IBM Directory Server 5.1, Server Plug-ins Reference, First Edition (November 2002).

- [16] C-Client SDK Programming Reference, First Edition (November 2002).
- [17] IBM Directory Server Version 5.1, QuickStart, First Edition (November 2002).
- [18] IBM Directory Server Version 5.1, Performance Tuning Guide, Second Edition (December, 2002)

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C Excerpts from the Criteria

CC Part 1:

Caveats on evaluation results (chapter 5.4) / **Final Interpretation 008**

The conformance result indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met by a TOE or PP that passes its evaluation. This conformance result is presented with respect to Part 2 (functional requirements), Part 3 (assurance requirements) and, if applicable, to a pre-defined set of requirements (e.g., EAL, Protection Profile).

The conformance result consists of one of the following:

Part 2 conformant - A PP or TOE is Part 2 conformant if the functional requirements are based only upon functional components in Part 2

Part 2 extended - A PP or TOE is Part 2 extended if the functional requirements include functional components not in Part 2

plus one of the following:

Part 3 conformant - A PP or TOE is Part 3 conformant if the assurance requirements are based only upon assurance components in Part 3

Part 3 extended - A PP or TOE is Part 3 extended if the assurance requirements include assurance requirements not in Part 3.

Additionally, the conformance result may include a statement made with respect to sets of defined requirements, in which case it consists of one of the following:

Package name Conformant - A PP or TOE is conformant to a pre-defined named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements (functions or assurance) include all components in the packages listed as part of the conformance result.

Package name Augmented - A PP or TOE is an augmentation of a pre-defined named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements (functions or assurance) are a proper superset of all components in the packages listed as part of the conformance result.

Finally, the conformance result may also include a statement made with respect to Protection Profiles, in which case it includes the following:

PP Conformant - A TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the conformance result.

CC Part 3:

Assurance categorisation (chapter 2.5)

„The assurance classes, families, and the abbreviation for each family are shown in Table 2.1.

| Assurance Class | Assurance Family | Abbreviated Name |
|-------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|-------------------------|
| Class ACM: Configuration management | CM automation | ACM_AUT |
| | CM capabilities | ACM_CAP |
| | CM scope | ACM_SCP |
| Class ADO: Delivery and operation | Delivery | ADO_DEL |
| | Installation, generation and start-up | ADO_IGS |
| Class ADV: Development | Functional specification | ADV_FSP |
| | High-level design | ADV_HLD |
| | Implementation representation | ADV_IMP |
| | TSF internals | ADV_INT |
| | Low-level design | ADV_LLD |
| | Representation correspondence | ADV_RCR |
| | Security policy modeling | ADV_SPM |
| | Class AGD: Guidance documents | Administrator guidance |
| | User guidance | AGD_USR |
| Class ALC: Life cycle support | Development security | ALC_DVS |
| | Flaw remediation | ALC_FLR |
| | Life cycle definition | ALC_LCD |
| | Tools and techniques | ALC_TAT |
| Class ATE: Tests | Coverage | ATE_COV |
| | Depth | ATE_DPT |
| | Functional tests | ATE_FUN |
| | Independent testing | ATE_IND |
| Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment | Covert channel analysis | AVA_CCA |
| | Misuse | AVA_MSU |
| | Strength of TOE security functions | AVA_SOF |
| | Vulnerability analysis | AVA_VLA |

Table 2.1 -Assurance family breakdown and mapping“

Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 6)

„The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use of the TOE.

It is important to note that not all families and components from Part 3 are included in the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.

Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 6.1)

Table 6.1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.

As outlined in the next section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by *substitution* of a hierarchically higher assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope, and/or depth) and from the *addition* of assurance components from other assurance families (i.e. adding new requirements).

These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described in chapter 2 of this Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component are addressed.

While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance component” is not recognised by the CC as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be extended with explicitly stated assurance requirements.

| Assurance Class | Assurance Family | Assurance Components by Evaluation Assurance Level | | | | | | |
|--------------------------|------------------|--|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| | | EAL1 | EAL2 | EAL3 | EAL4 | EAL5 | EAL6 | EAL7 |
| Configuration management | ACM_AUT | | | | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 |
| | ACM_CAP | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 5 | 5 |
| | ACM_SCP | | | 1 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| Delivery and operation | ADO_DEL | | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 3 |
| | ADO_IGS | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Development | ADV_FSP | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 4 |
| | ADV_HLD | | 1 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| | ADV_IMP | | | | 1 | 2 | 3 | 3 |
| | ADV_INT | | | | | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| | ADV_LLD | | | | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 |
| | ADV_RCR | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 3 |
| | ADV_SPM | | | | 1 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| Guidance documents | AGD_ADM | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| | AGD_USR | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Life cycle support | ALC_DVS | | | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 |
| | ALC_FLR | | | | | | | |
| | ALC_LCD | | | | 1 | 2 | 2 | 3 |
| | ALC_TAT | | | | 1 | 2 | 3 | 3 |
| Tests | ATE_COV | | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 3 |
| | ATE_DPT | | | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 3 |
| | ATE_FUN | | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 |
| | ATE_IND | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 3 |
| Vulnerability assessment | AVA_CCA | | | | | 1 | 2 | 2 |
| | AVA_MSU | | | 1 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 3 |
| | AVA_SOF | | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| | AVA_VLA | | 1 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 4 |

Table 6.1 - Evaluation assurance level summary“

Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 6.2.1)

„Objectives

EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the protection of personal or similar information.

EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.

An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner consistent with its documentation, and that it provides useful protection against identified threats.“

Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 6.2.2)

„Objectives

EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the developer than is consistent with good commercial practice. As such it should not require a substantially increased investment of cost or time.

EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.“

Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked (chapter 6.2.3)

„Objectives

EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound development practices.

EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE and its development without substantial re-engineering.“

Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed (chapter 6.2.4)

„Objectives

EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering based on good commercial development practices which, though rigorous,

do not require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the highest level at which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.

EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.“

Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested (chapter 6.2.5)

„Objectives

EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based upon rigorous commercial development practices supported by moderate application of specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the application of specialised techniques, will not be large.

EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to specialist security engineering techniques.“

Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and tested (chapter 6.2.6)

„Objectives

EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for protecting high value assets against significant risks.

EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.“

Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested (chapter 6.2.7)

„Objectives

EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.“

Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF) (chapter 14.3)**AVA_SOF** Strength of TOE security functions

„Objectives

Even if a TOE security function cannot be bypassed, deactivated, or corrupted, it may still be possible to defeat it because there is a vulnerability in the concept of its underlying security mechanisms. For those functions a qualification of their security behaviour can be made using the results of a quantitative or statistical analysis of the security behaviour of these mechanisms and the effort required to overcome them. The qualification is made in the form of a strength of TOE security function claim.“

Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA) (chapter 14.4)**AVA_VLA** Vulnerability analysis

„Objectives

Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether vulnerabilities identified, during the evaluation of the construction and anticipated operation of the TOE or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), could allow users to violate the TSP.

Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that a user will be able to discover flaws that will allow unauthorised access to resources (e.g. data), allow the ability to interfere with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.“

„Application notes

A vulnerability analysis is performed by the developer in order to ascertain the presence of security vulnerabilities, and should consider at least the contents of all the TOE deliverables including the ST for the targeted evaluation assurance level. The developer is required to document the disposition of identified vulnerabilities to allow the evaluator to make use of that information if it is found useful as a support for the evaluator's independent vulnerability analysis.“

„Independent vulnerability analysis goes beyond the vulnerabilities identified by the developer. The main intent of the evaluator analysis is to determine that the TOE is resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a low (for AVA_VLA.2), moderate (for AVA_VLA.3) or high (for AVA_VLA.4) attack potential.“